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ABSTRACT 
The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is a NASA Class 1E technology demonstration external payload aboard the 
International Space Station (ISS). With approximately one square meter of detection area, the SDS is attached to the 
European Space Agency Columbus module facing the ISS velocity vector with minimal obstruction from ISS 
hardware. The SDS is the first flight demonstration of the Debris Resistive/Acoustic Grid Orbital NASA-Navy 
Sensor (DRAGONS) technology developed and matured over 10 years by the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office 
(ODPO), in concert with the DRAGONS consortium, to provide information on the sub-millimeter scale orbital 
debris environment. The SDS demonstrated the capacity to read 4 resistive grids at 1 Hz, 40 acoustic sensors at 
500 kHz, and record and downlink impact data to the ground. Observable and derived data from the SDS could 
provide information to models that are critical to understanding risks the small debris environment poses to 
spacecraft in low Earth orbit. The technology demonstrated by the SDS is a major step forward in monitoring and 
characterizing the space debris environment. This paper will address the technical performance of the SDS during its 
operational lifetime and its realization of technical and scientific goals. The SDS was intended to operate for 3 years; 
however, the payload incurred multiple anomalies during its operational life. Subsequently termed “Anomaly #1,” 
the first was the symptomatic loss of low data rate 1553 channel command and telemetry. The second, Anomaly #2, 
was loss of all low- and medium-data rate (Ethernet) telemetry. Anomaly #2 proved to be unrecoverable, leading to 
loss of the payload after approximately 26 days on-board the ISS. Therefore, this paper also addresses the anomalies 
that occurred during operation of the SDS, their attribution, and their resolution. Lessons learned are described when 
relevant to anomaly identification, attribution, and resolution. 
1 OVERVIEW & TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION 
The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Class 1E technology 
demonstration external payload aboard the International Space Station (ISS) [1]. The SDS was the first flight 
demonstration of the Debris Resistive/Acoustic Grid Orbital NASA-Navy Sensor (DRAGONS) technology 
developed and matured by the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO). In collaboration with the Naval 
Research Laboratory, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the University of Kent, the DRAGONS sensor was created to 
provide information on the orbital debris population that is too small for ground-based remote sensing. The SDS 
payload was required to operate for a minimum of 2 years, detect impacts larger than 50 μm, and record impact time 
and location as well as projectile direction, speed, and size. It consisted of three layers, the first a resistive grid layer 
to detect impacts and infer debris particle sizes, the second an unpowered grid, and the third a solid backstop to 
measure impact energy. All three layers had acoustic sensors to detect impact times and locations. The first and 
second layers had 16 acoustic sensors each, and the third layer had 8, for a total of 40. The time of impact on 
sequential layers provides a measure of the relative velocity of an impacting particle. The energy on the backstop 
would provide a measure of the particle density. SDS demonstrated the technology required to read and record 
4 resistive grids at 1 Hz, 40 acoustic sensors at 500 kHz, and downlink impact data to the ground. The daily 1 Hz 
data consisted of a counter of impacts recorded, ISS state vector and attitude, resistance values, temperatures for 
each of the 10 acoustically distinct areas, and voltage readings from each acoustic sensor. When triggered by an 
acoustic sensor reading above a set, user-configurable threshold, the SDS recorded 2.5 ms of data. SDS data was 
recorded in three types of files: acoustic, compact reconfigurable input/output (RIO) and single-board RIO 
controllers (cRIO and sbRIO) data, and health and status (H&S) files. When commanded from the ground, data were 
downlinked to the NASA Payload Operations and Integration Center. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190033909 2020-03-11T13:39:24+00:00Z
The SDS was launched to the ISS inboard the trunk of the Space-X Dragon vehicle on 15 December 2017 and was 
installed on the Columbus module of the ISS on 1 January 2018. The SDS collected over 1200 acoustic detection 
files, approximately 26 days of resistance/engineering data, and demonstrated impact detection in the flight 
environment. Unfortunately, shortly after the beginning of operations, the SDS began experiencing anomalous 
behavior, and after approximately 26 days, became unresponsive. Due to its prematurely terminated mission, the 
SDS failed to operate over a 2-year time interval, observe an acknowledged impact on the backstop layer, and 
resolve projectile mass density from impact energy delivered to the backstop. Despite its short operational lifetime, 
the SDS mission was a success in detecting impacts and determining impact time and location. The SDS technology 
demonstration scorecard is provided in Table 1. Impact time and location was successfully demonstrated, evident by 
the over 1200 triggered events recorded in the acoustic data stream. The projectile direction, speed, size, and density 
could not be characterized due to there being no valid impacts on the second and third layers, and no correlation 
between gridline severs and acoustic events, which resulted in ‘fail’ scores. However, environmental data and the 
SDS performance continue to inform the development of other operational in situ sensors. 
Table 1. SDS Technology Scorecard. Green = pass, red = fail. 
 
2 MMOD MEASUREMENT 
The dual goals of the SDS were to update the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment definition 
from a scientific perspective and conduct a technology demonstration. Analysis of SDS science data suggests it is 
consistent with the ISS-altitude MMOD environment for the short area-time product. The Hypervelocity Impact 
Technology (HVIT) group performed MMOD impact risk assessments using the BUMPER II finite element-
modeling program [2] for the SDS 2018-2020 installation, which uses NASA’s latest Meteoroid Engineering Model 
(MEM-R2 [3]) and Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM 3.0 [4]). Results of the BUMPER II modeling is 
shown in Fig. 1, scaled to the estimated sensor uptime of 22.12 days. White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) ground 
testing demonstrated that the SDS successfully detected 50 µm projectiles at 7 km/s and this is indicated by the 
vertical dashed line in the figure. Five valid impacts were recorded by SDS, and these appear consistent with the 
expected number of impacts down to this approximate detection threshold. 
 Fig. 1. SDS valid measurements compared to Bumper II total environment prediction. 
In Fig. 1, projectile sizes were estimated by a relationship derived in WSTF testing between peak acoustic signal 
strength and projectile size; actual particle size is less than or equal to that portrayed in the figure. This relationship 
was demonstrated with sufficient accuracy to apply in lieu of grid line breaks. No grid line breaks were associated 
with acoustically triggered events on orbit. This is not unexpected given the short operational SDS lifetime and the 
preponderance of smaller MMOD in power law models of the environment. 
3 SCIENCE DATA APPLICATIONS 
3.1 Resistance Data 
A resistance change on the SDS grid indicated a resistance grid line broken, from which the impact hole size can be 
estimated (and therefore particle size) based on damage models derived from hypervelocity testing. It was observed 
the first few days after installation aboard the ISS that SDS displayed a “burn-in” effect change in resistance on all 
resistive subgrids, which stabilized after approximately a week. Figure 2 illustrates an example of the beginning 
“burn-in” effect followed by stabilization for a resistor with change in time. More generally, resistance displayed a 
regular, repeating pattern as the temperature varied, as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Typical SDS subgrid resistance behavior over operational lifetime (2018-day number). Note burn-in period. 
 Fig. 3. Example of a resistor's response to cyclic temperature changes and an irreversible change of approximately 
1.5 Ω. This change in resistance is consistent with the breaking of one grid line.  
Potential impacts were identified as a resistance change (1 ohm [Ω] or more) over each resistor. There were 
approximately 27 instances of this behavior over the course of operation of the SDS. The 27 potential impacts were 
normalized to their first recorded resistance in each resistor time interval (when the resistance change became 
greater than 1Ω). Figure 4 illustrates each identified resistor with a resistance change greater than 1Ω over a time 
interval.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Twenty-seven resistor behaviors over time. 
Two different modalities of resistance change were observed. The behavior is separated based on the duration of 
resistance change and the length of time that elapsed between the 1Ω changes. Characterized as either a slow “S” 
curve or a “prompt” jump in resistance (top two charts in Fig. 5, respectively), the latter would be expected in the 
case of an impact-induced sever, and is consistent with SDS grid ground testing (bottom chart in Fig. 5). The time 
interval from which the “S” curve changes resistance does not follow ground testing’s instantaneous resistance 
change for an impact. Ground testing produced an immediate 1Ω jump in resistance, while the “S” curve resistor 
behavior on average lasted 20 seconds. The phenomenology of the “S” events is not understood at this time, but it is 
unlikely to be associated with an impact. 
 
Fig. 5. SDS Resistor behavior on orbit (top) and ground testing resistor behavior (bottom). 
3.2 Acoustic Data 
Acoustic sensors were placed on the SDS with the goal of detecting impact-induced acoustic waves in the grid’s 
Kapton substrate. The SDS produced 1287 recoverable acoustic data files during its operation (some acoustic files 
were lost prior to downlink due to the circumstances of SDS anomalous behavior). Observed acoustic irregularities 
occurred during operation such as radio frequency (RF) flash, electromagnetic interference (EMI) signals, and 
signals being recorded in only one sensor (A), quadrant (Q), or layer (L). Due to the complexity of these signals and 
to expedite the impact detection process, acoustic files were classified into five categories (Table 2). A flowchart of 
the classification process is additionally provided in Fig. 6.  
Table 2. Classifications of acoustic files.  
 
Identification Characteristics
EMI
Signal appearing first on L3, wave packet shaped, constant 
wave pattern, or file created by noisy sensor.
One Sensor Response
Only showing signal on one sensor and in one quadrant and 
layer.
Flash
Large impulse signal showing simultaneously on multiple 
sensors, directly followed by flat line. 
Probable Sensor Malfunction
Discontinuities of sensor output, or signal indicating 
instantaneous jump from negative to positive voltage.
Potential Acoustic Response
All else not classified as above. Time delays are consistent with 
expected acoustic travel time (from ground testing), large, low 
frequency impulse signals that are well defined and located. 
Observed in multiple layers, quadrants, and sensors.
 
Fig. 6. SDS acoustic file classification process. 
Of the acoustic files created, approximately 58% were EMI files, 40% were one-sensor response, 1.5% were flash 
response, and less than 1% were sensor malfunction and potential acoustic responses. After removing EMI and 
sensor malfunction types, 534 acoustic files were left. The SDS did not incur any impact penetrations through three 
grid layers, thus preventing the determination of impactor relative velocity and mass density. Seven candidate 
impacts were left that matched the acoustic response characteristics described in Table 2. These candidates were 
additionally analyzed by an acoustic signal subject matter expert with the conclusion that all files in Table 3 
excepting #1226 were most likely an impact event, leaving the candidate impact total at six. One impact (#617) was 
omitted from both further analysis and Fig. 1 (estimated size well below 30 μm, the programmatic threshold of 
interest), leaving five valid impacts. 
 
Table 3. SDS impact candidates, date/time impacted, and estimated maximum impactor size. 
 
4 Anomaly Resolution 
The SDS payload experienced H&S lockups beginning shortly after its installation on 1 January 2018. Termed 
“Anomaly #1” in retrospect, this anomaly resulted in the SDS no longer sending H&S data or responding to 
commands over the 1553-standard low data rate channel. Commanded hard power recycles provided a temporary 
work-around to clear the ‘locked-up’ state and restore the payload to nominal operation. Three weeks into operation, 
the SDS did not recover from three consecutive power recycle attempts to cope with Anomaly #1, and the payload 
failed to send any data or accept commands on either the 1553 low-data rate channel or the medium-data rate 
Ethernet channel. This failure to respond was termed “Anomaly #2.” Additional power cycles were also 
unsuccessful, and the payload was placed in a “safe” state with heater (direct current DC/DC converter) power on 
and operational (cRIO) power off. While never logged as a formal payload anomaly, SDS heater string performance 
(as indicated by DC/DC converter power draw) was also compromised. The heater’s off-nominal performance was 
detected only during the electrical/amperage draw analysis performed while troubleshooting Anomalies #1 and #2. 
Observed power draw was consistent with only one of the two heater strings being functional. SDS staff referred to 
this condition colloquially as “Anomaly #3.” As ISS orbital and configuration parameters, including payload 
insolation and the single heater string, were sufficient to maintain SDS environmental conditions in its nominal 
operating temperature range, emphasis was placed on resolving Anomalies #1 and #2. Anomalies #1 and #2 were 
formally reported in the NASA Payload Anomaly Reporting tool. Since Anomaly #3 did not impact payload 
operations, it was not formally reported. For a more thorough description of the SDS anomaly attribution, see [5]. 
Environmental effects and conditions, which could possibly interfere with SDS operational functionality, were 
analyzed as part of the anomaly resolution process and are discussed in the following section. 
4.1 Environmental Effects 
Environmental effects such as temperature, geographic location, space radiation, and trapped particles were all 
analyzed for correlating with lockups of the SDS, but also facilitated an exploration into the orbital environment of 
the ISS and SDS technologies. After an observed “burn-in” effect for the first week of SDS operation, the SDS cRIO 
temperature did not experience significant deviation from the average temperature. SDS thermal management was 
composed of thermostats and dual Kapton film heater strings. The heaters were powered during ascent and on-orbit 
storage in the Space-X Dragon trunk by the trunk’s power distribution system and by the ISS after installation. 
Certain irregularities with regard to expected power draw were noted when powered either inboard the Dragon trunk 
or on-orbit. The working hypothesis is that after the heater turned on on-orbit, the resulting thermal expansion 
caused it to disconnect because the connection was already loose (Anomaly #3). The SDS temperature fell to 
ambient (day/night cycle, beta angle) heating and concomitant temperatures when unpowered. However, the 
temperatures never fell below -16 C (with the lower operational limit at -40 C). Geographic and environmental 
effects (ISS-local, orbital, etc.) on SDS behavior were examined. The beta angle (proportional to the percentage of 
time the object spends in direct sunlight) at which the ISS was positioned was considered (Fig. 7). After adjusting 
for time the SDS spent at each beta angle, there appears to be no effect of beta angle on the SDS, and it is unlikely 
there is a relationship between the number of lockups and beta angle.  
 
Fig. 7. The number of lockups that occurred each day on the SDS charted with the daily Beta angle. 
The SDS environmental effects investigation continued with observation of lockup occurrences at calculated orbital 
dawns. Figure 8 displays the lockups associated with a position of the ISS at orbital dawn. One lockup was 
correlated to orbital dawn but was interpreted as random chance, with no fundamental correlation of SDS lockups to 
orbital dawn. 
 Fig. 8. Location of the ISS during lockup occurrences (yellow) and orbital dawn associated lockup (red). 
Another consideration is Earth-fixed coordinates (latitude-longitude of sub-satellite point, altitude above geoid) of 
lockups, and any possible correlation with the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) or ground-based space surveillance 
radars. The latitude and longitude coordinates of the SDS during lockups were compared to observe any occurrences 
of geographic position influence of the SDS. The total number of lockups was tallied into latitude ranges. The 
dependence on time in orbit at outermost latitudes was removed by using the Kessler function [6]. There was an 
uneven distribution of lockup occurrences, with a higher number of lockups occurring above the equator in the 
northern latitudes (Fig. 9).To formally test this hypothesis, a non-parametric test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, [7]) of the 
equality of lockups to latitude distribution was executed. There was sufficient evidence to suggest the data does not 
follow a uniform distribution, and it was inferred that the lockup occurrences have a minor relationship to latitude 
position. However, this relationship was not significantly different enough from a random distribution to be 
considered a cause of the lockup behavior.  
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Number of lockup occurrences and the Earth-fixed coordinates at which they occurred. 
Other environmental components analyzed include relatively low-energy solar cosmic rays (SCRs), protons, and 
heavier ions; galactic cosmic rays (GCRs), produced by active galactic nuclei, and – internal to the Milky Way 
galaxy – supernovae and other energetic events and phenomena; and trapped particles (protons and electrons, 
including the SAA). During SDS’ operational lifetime, there were no coronal mass ejections (proton rich) recorded, 
no X-ray flare events, nor reported SCR/GCR events. Solar weather, due to the solar wind and Earth magnetospheric 
particle ingestion, correlates with a disturbed geomagnetic field; this was examined for January 2018 to cover SDS’ 
operational lifetime. A comparison of geomagnetic indices with number of lockups per day is shown in Fig. 10. No 
correlations are observed between the two variables.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Number of lockup occurrences compared with daily geomagnetism indices. 
EMI and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) were explored due to the large number of acoustic EMI files created. 
The geographic location of EMI file creation was charted and associated with lockups (Fig. 11). EMI/EMC at ISS 
altitude does not appear to be a probable contributing factor in lockups.  
 
 
Fig. 11. EMI files and lockup occurrences. 
Several unresolved correlations remain between SDS performance and ISS local or global environments. A number 
of SDS acoustic sensors exhibit long period (hours to days) noise phenomena; there appear to be several “beat” 
phenomena experienced by an otherwise quiet, nominally operating sensor (Fig. 12).While currently unexplained, 
science data analysis will attempt to identify and characterize this phenomenon further, including an estimate of 
noise frequency. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Acoustic Sensor 3 recording of beat phenomena over a 3-day period. 
4.2 Lessons Learned and Extensions to other Flight Profiles 
SDS mission experience and lessons learned were carefully documented to maximize team success in future 
missions of in situ sensors. The SDS mission teams (Engineering and Operations) compiled these during the 
anomaly resolution and payload recovery effort, and documented them in a formal root cause analysis and anomaly 
resolution report. Areas of consideration for root cause assessment were the system architecture, sensors, electronic 
box, verifications, science data, and documentation. Overall, the environmental analysis indicated there was no clear 
relationship to either of the anomalies excepting a slight dependence on latitude. Anomaly #1 was attributed to a 
cRIO-sbRIO communications thread interruption, and the most probable cause of Anomaly #2 was determined to be 
a hardware failure of the boot sector-memory storage on the cRIO processor. While the environmental analysis was 
initiated in an effort to address Anomaly #1, all science data and lessons learned from the SDS mission directly 
assists other sensor and flight profiles in development.  
5 Conclusions 
SDS is a technology demonstrator flight payload developed under the NASA Class 1E program for experimental 
spaceflight hardware that demonstrated MMOD environmental measurements. The mission was hindered by 
reduced operational uptime and the unrecoverable loss of the payload after approximately 26 days onboard the ISS. 
Nonetheless, observable and derived science data from the SDS provided sensor technology for in situ MMOD 
environmental measurements and demonstrated consistent results with the ORDEM 3.0 and MEM-R2 
environmental models for understanding risks that the small debris environment poses to spacecraft at the ISS 
altitude. Following the analysis of SDS-derived data, there are no likely relationships (other than slight latitude bias) 
between Anomaly #1 lockups and resistance, temperature, beta angle, orbital dawn, space weather/radiation effects, 
or EMI/EMC. The anomalies were determined to originate from file writing and memory storage errors. Currently, 
SDS is being prepared for disposal aboard the commercial resupply Cygnus vehicle Northrup-Grumman Number 12. 
During this process, the SDS sensor and electronics box module’s surfaces are to be inspected for MMOD impact 
using ISS on-board high-resolution video. These may further inform both technology demonstration and science 
applications for other sensors and flight profiles. 
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